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The paper presents short summaries and analyses of two books by Eviatar Zerubavel 
(2018a; 2020) that are demonstrations of his approach to cognitive sociology. The first 
book (2018a) shows examples of the analysis in Zerubavelian cognitive sociology, and 
the second one is a methodological and theoretical elaboration of his approach 
described in formal terms. We analyze the approach presented at the end of the paper, 
showing that the analysis of distinctions and perceptive categories is essential in 
Zerubavel analysis. Still, there is an unclear dimension (in between) included in the 
contexts of perception, lived experiences, and perception of the world beyond the 
categories that we introduce in our analysis. 
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Presentation of the Books and Concepts 
  
Eviatar Zerubavel (2020) recently wrote a book that summarizes his approach to 
analyzing social phenomena from a cognitive sociology perspective. This perspective is rooted 
in interactionist tradition, especially in Simmelian sociology and Goffmanian perspective. The 
perception of reality is socially framed, and we use it in interactions, usually when we do not 
know about the origin of our categories of perception or about the ignorance that comes from 
the blindness created by the points of attention that is ignited by the inherited cognitive frames 
for perception and categories of seeing and not seeing some objects. Therefore, how can we 
analyze ignored phenomena and facts that are so close to us and possibly in direct view? 
Zerubavel shows a practical method of analysis in the book Taken for Granted: The 
Remarkable Power of the Unremarkable, published in 2018. It presents the method of 
analyzing the areas of ignorance and imperception that are in the background of what we see. 
The author shows that when we concentrate more on one part of a phenomenon, we do not see 
another, obvious part; one that is, for this reason, not marked.  
We assume the second part of the distinction in a category by default and take it for 
granted. When we say “woman murderer,” we mark it; when we say murderer, we believe that 
it is a man. Usually, an occupations’ labels are considered masculine; otherwise, they are 
marked as feminine. We should not exceed the masculine labels, and we assume that 
occupations and professions are mainly masculine (for example, a plumber). Among many 
anthropologists, the word man is practically a synonym of male, although it theoretically refers 
to human beings (Perez, 2019, p. 4). Seemingly, gender-neutral labels such as user, participant, 
person, designer, or researcher were perceived mainly as masculine in gender (Bradley et al., 
2015). When we label homosexuals, we hide heterosexuals, whom we take for granted. These 
lexical gaps arise when we rarely use some terms because some objects are understood per 
se and do not need explanations with other words.  
The sociologist’s goal, which uses the cognitive perspective in the analysis, is to show 
how phenomena are perceived and not perceived. This goal is expressed in the sentence below: 
Krzysztof T. Konecki                           1151 
Studying the unmarked, in short, requires exceptional self-reflectiveness about 
what we habitually and thus pre-reflectively take for granted! (Zerubavel, 
2018a, p. 9) 
 
The sociology of looking for unarticulated and silenced phenomena is the sociology of 
everyday life. Therefore, the politics of attention management exists in our everyday life, in 
the language used in the media and ordinary conversations. Not noticing something is 
meaningful, and it could have political meanings in relation to power. The first is the power of 
language, and secondly, it is connected with social structure and institutions. Social order could 
be maintained by using certain linguistic categories and assuming other ones. Unmarkedness 
is a political tool that is often used unconsciously by social actors, and revealing this 
phenomenon is a goal of cognitive sociologists. Gender and color are often assumed, if not 
mentioned; when we speak about humans, they are usually considered male and white. 
Dominance is included in the frames of how reality is perceived, although it is called normality 
(Zerubavel, 2018b, p. 58). Discussions about these frames of perception could be liberating, or 
they might start a new way of perceiving social objects. I think it is also a socially important 
consequence of Zerubavelian sociology. 
Naming some unmarked phenomena makes them visible (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 65). 
Studying maleness shows male language’s dominance and the dominance of maleness in the 
social structure (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 69).  
We see that a person is social and is socially determined in his or her perception. 
Socialized language is vital for reproducing social structure and power. To build the conceptual 
structure of this cognitive determination, Zerubavel refers to the semiotics of Nikolai 
Trubetzkoy, and of fellow linguist, Roman Jakobson. Social distinctions are derivatives of the 
perceptive categories and marking or not marking some part of the categories that make 
distinctions. One thing can be unique and marked, while something else is “normal” and 
“ordinary,” not significant enough to mark and mention in the public discourse (Zerubavel, 
2018a, p. 97). Society produces attentional norms – what it is vital to see and talk about, and 
what it is not essential to notice. And these “unimportant to notice” objects could be decisive 
in keeping social order intact. Unmarkedness is meaningful. Zerubavel delivers a tool to 
uncover what is not mentioned, to foreground what is implicit. The dominance of some social 
forces could be made explicit. Personal feelings could be less important than attentional norms 




The second book I present in this paper, Generally Speaking: An Invitation to Concept 
Driven Sociology, summarizes the methodological and epistemological knowledge that comes 
from the scientific work experiences of Eviatar Zerubavel, who created and used theoretical 
concepts to analyze social phenomena in sociology. The book refers to many of the author’s 
previous publications, so at the beginning, I mention mainly the first important breakthrough 
book here (The Fine Line. Making Distinctions in Everyday Life, 1991), where inspiration from 
gestalt psychology is the start of thinking on perceived and not perceived objects and the socio-
psychological phenomena of ignoring, the conspiracy of silence, social distinctions, fuzzy 
minds, “unmarkedness,” and semiotic asymmetry, which we can find in the author’s other 
books (Zerubavel, 2015a, 2015b, 2018a). 
Zerubavel is skeptical about the division of theory and methodology, writing that it is 
a “false distinction.” He states that theory and methodology are strictly connected. A theory is 
needed to see something at all, while an a priori scheme of perception is needed in research. 
Zerubavel is not a data-driven analyst, as he testifies in the book (Zerubavel, 2020, p. 2). His 
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concept-driven sociology is from a different perspective than grounded theory (GT). GT is a 
data-driven methodology, and concepts are created in collecting and analyzing empirical data. 
However, the goal is the same, that is, to create a theory to understand phenomena and the 
conditions for their existence. Looking for patterns is the main strategy of concept-driven 
sociology. Grounded theory also aims to reconstruct patterns, but it starts with data and the 
analysis of the data, sometimes with the help of sensitizing concepts (Blumer, 1969; Charmaz, 
2006). 
At the beginning of any research, analyst-researchers (they should be called analysts 
because they analyze extant data more than ethnographically collected data) follow proto-ideas 
(Zerubavel, 2020, p. 4), which leads them to observe reality and analyze it through the prisms 
of concepts. Later, analyst-researchers sharpen the categories and make them clear-cut 
concepts. These proto-concepts, and the topics associated with them, lead sociologists in their 
analytical work and help them focus on examples that help define concepts that describe some 
social phenomena theoretically (Zerubavel, 2020, p. 7). Existing concepts might be useful to 
see and analyze the social reality; so, generally, a scientist’s attentional socialization helps him 
or her see some phenomena.   
By using or creating concepts through generalizations, one can transgress the borders 
of situations, societies, or historical periods, as in the analysis of totemism in Australia 
(Zerubavel, 2020, p. 13). This is formal sociology (in reference to Simmel), which can be 
applied in many situations by transgressing them (Zerubavel, 1980, 1995). Zerubavel goes into 
trans-situational, conceptual sociology, which creates general concepts but not universal ones, 
which he explicitly underlines (Zerubavel, 2020, pp. 17-18). 
Exampling is a strategy to show and sensitize the constructed concepts. Examples are 
treated as data that help to theorize, and this strategy is very similar to the one used by Erving 
Goffman (1974) in many of his analyses. Examples might represent patterns. Exemplification 
proves and shows the concretization of concepts, categories, and patterns of conceptually 
described phenomena. This is what happens in concept-driven sociology, and it is similar to 
presenting analytical reports in constructivist grounded theory research (Charmaz, 2006). 
Examples from a different context—situational, historical, or cultural—might ensure the 
generalizability of the concept. Thus, researchers look for similarities, lumping them from these 
examples but ignoring any differences and peculiarities (Zerubavel, 2020, pp. 27-29). 
When comparing empirical cases from different contexts or different structural levels 
of society, we think analogically. The analyst-researcher ignores singularity and disregards 
context—historical or cultural—in formulating patterns. If he or she analyzes collective 
remembering, for example, the political fight over the tokens that are important in our past can 
be seen. Sometimes we have a redefinition of collective memory, exemplified in historical 
handbooks at school, or in the erecting of new monuments, or the naming of streets, airports, 
or railway stations for national heroes, which can signify a new vision of the past.  
Zerubavel states that removing the context during an analysis is a methodological virtue 
(Zerubavel, 2020, p. 63). Analogical transfers might be very illuminating and creative, and 
comparative analysis across substantive fields was also the methodological principle used by 
Everett Hughes (Hughes, 1971, p. 316). Zerubavel believes that breaking the habit of seeking 
differences and starting to look for similarities between “incomparable objects” might give us 
innovative findings (Zerubavel, 2020, pp. 70-71), and he also states that looking for deep 




We need concepts to see reality from a particular perspective. This is the obvious truth, 
and we all probably agree. We see reality through filters, special spectacles, and reconstructing 
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it can reveal the veiled dimensions of social life. I can agree with this option of analysis. 
However, we need more spectacles to see more—and not only inherited concepts. We want to 
look for slots in reality to find something new. We need to contemplate when to choose the 
concepts or theories or to create new concepts. Why do we change the filter of perception? 
Why do we change the spectacles? What is the reason for choosing this kind of concept and 
not another one? What are we really looking for by using concepts if we know in advance what 
the reality is?  
When I have chosen the concepts, I should ask: How did I find myself at this moment 
of theorizing? What existed before in my theorizing situation, what is there now, and what do 
I want to achieve with these concepts? Thus, we need contemplation at that moment (Bentz & 
Giorgino, 2016). When we follow the concept of looking at reality, we can be concise and 
disciplined in our investigation endeavor. Still, in this way, we can lose what the proto-ideas 
that lead us do not notice. These other phenomena (they may be casual or intervening 
conditions) do exist in reality, however, and they could influence phenomena named with 
preconceived concepts. All these preconceived concepts can make the researchers blind, as 
they become focused on a reality that is already structured by concepts. 
Abandoning the ethnographic or historical contexts of investigated phenomena could 
be misleading when sharpening the concepts that might finally describe the conceptual reality 
created by the researcher.   
Zerubavel underlines that concept-driven sociology, being trans-contextual, that is, 
crossing different substantive, historical, and cultural domains, could be a very creative 
endeavor. However, theory or concepts can limit the researcher from accessing his or her 
intuition—tacit knowledge that itself can inspire discoveries when exploring some domains of 
reality. Below, I quote Hungarian poet and writer Sandor Marai to show that a preconceived 
theory, or focusing on a theory and concepts and schemes, can limit creativity and the 
motivation to work directly with some parts of reality, like sounds or bodies. A theoretically 
focused mind could work in this way: 
 
I was visited by a lawyer from Pest who now has a factory here, and he told me 
that Bartók had struggled with serious financial problems in the last years of his 
life. He had a chance to work at the local universities on condition that he taught 
composition. But he did not want to teach composition because he was afraid 
that if he became too conscious of theory, he would lose his desire to compose. 
Like Mikszáth’s blacksmith, who could perform eye surgery with a penknife 
until someone explained to him more precisely what the human eye actually is. 
(Marai, 2017, p. 287; entry dated April 19, 1953)  
 
Zerubavel mentions the difference between his perspective of concept-driven sociology 
and grounded theory methodology (GTM): “Unlike grounded-theory practitioners, concept-
driven sociologists actually establish their initial theoretical concerns before they even start 
collecting their data. It is their unmistakably conceptual focus. Indeed, that drives the empirical 
part of their research” (Zerubavel, 2020, p. 6). Yes, this is a tremendous difference with any 
GT.  However, there are many different kinds of GT style of theorizing and research. Barney 
Glaser and his school of Classical Grounded Theory are empirically driven, and they assume 
an almost blank mind before going to the field of research (Glaser, 1978, 1992, 2002; Glaser 
& Holton, 2004). Strauss and Corbin’s style of GTM is more moderate. Some structural 
perception in reality is given a priori (conditions, causes, actions, contexts, and consequences; 
Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Charmaz’s approach (2006, 2008) is, in turn, a constructivist style of 
research, more abductive than deductive. Concepts are important, although they do not always 
dominate when directing the researcher in searching for the properties to saturate them. 
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Charmaz used preconceived concepts and treated them as sensitizing concepts, but she was not 
attached to them, as is the case in concept-driven sociology. In each style of GTM, there is a 
necessity to ground the categories in empirical evidence and have conceptual but empirically 
based properties of categories. We can define concepts and look for their connections with each 
other later. Concepts are grounded in empirical findings. 
Concept-driven sociology is a kind of structuralist sociology. It is not interested in the 
subject’s feelings, the lived experience or in the creation of and sometimes battle, negotiations, 
or manipulations over the patterns of behaviors (described by them) imposed on the individual. 
This kind of sociology is not interested in the living experiences of an individual in context. 
Some structure and patterns of human minds and bodies exist. Pre-linguistic and interactionally 
driven cognition, here and now, in social interaction is not the aim of such research. But it does 
not mean that concept-driven research is not valid or not needed. We need to structure our 
analytical endeavors to have generalizations, and we can use many inspirations from 
Zerubavel’s methodological proposals, for example, analogical thinking or looking for 
“unmarked phenomena.” They are also illuminating and helpful when researching lived 
experiences in situational contexts. Ethnographical research also needs to reconstruct patterns 
and to contemplate the subjects’ feelings in the interaction, which could enrich such research. 
I personally incorporate some concept-driven sociology rules in other sociological research 
styles, such as sociological ethnography, contemplative sociology, sociology based on personal 
documents, and even analytical autoethnography.  
As a contemplative sociologist (Konecki, 2018; see also Bentz & Giorgino, 2016), I 
accept the inspiration concerning the mind’s work. The two mental processes of lumping and 
splitting (Zerubavel, 1991, 2020), used to separate the island of meaning, need careful 
attention. But it is also necessary to check the subjects’ living experiences and their thoughts, 
body feelings, and emotions that appear during the lumping and splitting. Is it only a habitual 
act or reflexive based on the commonsense analysis of the rules of behaviors and the boundaries 
that they create? How can we separate mental clusters of artists from scientists if some 
humanistic researchers connect both domains? (Zerubavel, 1991, p. 21) What contemplative 
practices are used to make such distinctions or lumping? If we experience gaps between the 
domains that induce us to divide two provinces of meaning, why do we not connect them? 
What is the reason for connecting or splitting? 
 The gap that appears in meditation between thoughts is sometimes the aim of 
meditation; however, in this situation, the void or emptiness shows the connection, not a 
division. Contemplating it could explain to us why it happens. Separation also evokes feelings, 
and it is fascinating what is going on during that time, at that point, or just in the image of the 
separation of me from you; the separation of the frame of a picture from you in the situation of 
seeing; the separation of my village from your village; the separation of present me from the 
old me.   
Between separated worlds, there is a “gray area,” a space where something is in the 
potentiality of being; there is an uncertain feeling of something that could happen, but it is still 
suspended in non-execution. Intuition might feel it, but concepts cannot describe it yet. It is a 
“Country of Metaxy” (μεταξύ)—as described by Tokarczuk, (2020)—where we have a space 
between two worlds, and it is blurred, unclear, and open to metaphorical, analogous thinking. 
It is also immersed in non-linear being, a world where concepts overlap, where something new 
and original can emerge. In the world between, symbols are not treated literally, but they give 
inspiration for interpretation. There are meanings behind the literal signs that need 
interpretative work and intellectual speculation. There is something between small and big 
groups, between self and other, between life and death, body and mind, reason and emotions, 
wisdom and stupidity, theory and empirical facts. The interbeing is often felt and experienced 
but not always named. There are images, but not exact categories and concepts that divide the 
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world into clear distinctive areas of being. We can look for them while analyzing general 
concepts to avoid literal and distinctive thinking and to look for meanings that change and 
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